



Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis

Project:

3051S Pressure Transmitter,
Software Revision 6.0 and below

Customer:

Rosemount Inc.
Chanhassen, Minnesota
USA

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Management summary

This report summarizes the results of the Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter with Software Revision 6.0 and below. A Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis is one of the steps to be taken to achieve functional safety certification per IEC 61508 of a device. From the FMEDA, failure rates and Safe Failure Fraction are determined. The FMEDA that is described in this report concerns only the hardware of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter, electronic and mechanical. For full functional safety certification purposes all requirements of IEC 61508 must be considered.

The 3051S Pressure Transmitter is an isolated two-wire, 4 – 20 mA smart device. It contains self-diagnostics and is programmed to send it's output to a specified failure state, either high or low upon internal detection of a failure. For safety instrumented systems usage it is assumed that the 4 – 20 mA output is used as the primary safety variable. All other possible output variants are not covered by this report. The different devices can be equipped with or without display.

The 3051S Pressure Transmitter with Software Revision 6.0 and below is classified as a Type B¹ device according to IEC61508, having a hardware fault tolerance of 0. The analysis shows that the device has a safe failure fraction between 60 and 90% (assuming that the logic solver is programmed to detect over-scale and under-scale currents) and therefore may be used up to SIL 1 as a single device.

The failure rates for the 3051S_C Coplanar version are as follows:

$$\lambda^H = 59 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

$$\lambda^L = 283 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

$$\lambda^{DU} = 63 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

Table 1 lists the failure rates for 3051S Coplanar Pressure Transmitter according to IEC 61508, assuming that the logic solver can detect both over-scale and under-scale currents and that detected failure results in a low output of the transmitter.

Table 1: Failure rates according to IEC 61508, 3051S_C Coplanar

A	λ_{sd}	λ_{su}^*	λ_{dd}	λ_{du}	SFF
Low trip	283 FIT	140 FIT	59 FIT	63 FIT	88.4%
High trip	59 FIT	140 FIT	283 FIT	63 FIT	88.4%

(* Note that the SU category includes failures that do not cause a spurious trip)

The failure rates for the 3051S_T In-Line version are as follows:

$$\lambda^H = 58 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

$$\lambda^L = 264 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

$$\lambda^{DU} = 56 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

Table 2 lists the failure rates for 3051S In-Line Pressure Transmitter according to IEC 61508, assuming that the logic solver can detect both over-scale and under-scale currents and that detected failure results in a low output of the transmitter.

Type B component: "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.3.1.3 of IEC 61508-2.

Table 2: Failure rates according to IEC 61508, 3051S_T In-Line

Failure Categories	λ_{sd}	λ_{su}^*	λ_{dd}	λ_{du}	SFF
Low trip	264 FIT	120 FIT	58 FIT	56 FIT	88.7%
High trip	58 FIT	120 FIT	264 FIT	56 FIT	88.7%

(*Note that the SU category includes failures that do not cause a spurious trip)

These failure rates are valid for the useful lifetime of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter, see Appendix A.

A user of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter with Software Revision 6.0 and below can utilize these failure rates in a probabilistic model of a safety instrumented function (SIF) to determine suitability in part for safety instrumented system (SIS) usage in a particular safety integrity level (SIL). An overview of all assumptions including an example on how to use the failure rates is presented in sections 4 and 5.

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1 Purpose and Scope

Generally three options exist when doing an assessment of sensors, interfaces and/or final elements.

Option 1: Hardware assessment according to IEC 61508

Option 1 is a hardware assessment by *exida.com* according to the relevant functional safety standard(s) like DIN V VDE 0801, IEC 61508 or EN 954-1. The hardware assessment consists of a FMEDA to determine the fault behavior and the different failure rates resulting in the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) and the average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD_{AVG}).

This option for pre-existing hardware devices shall provide the safety instrumentation engineer with the required failure data as per IEC 61508 / IEC 61511 and does not include any software assessment.

Option 2: Hardware assessment with proven-in-use consideration according to IEC 61508 / IEC 61511

Option 2 is an assessment by *exida.com* according to the relevant functional safety standard(s) like DIN V VDE 0801, IEC 61508 or EN 954-1. The hardware assessment consists of a FMEDA to determine the fault behavior and the different failure rates resulting in the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) and the average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD_{AVG}). In addition, this option includes an assessment of the proven-in-use demonstration of the device and its software including the modification process.

This option for pre-existing programmable electronic devices shall provide the safety instrumentation engineer with the required failure data as per IEC 61508 / IEC 61511 and justify the reduced fault tolerance requirements of IEC 61511 for sensors, final elements and other PE field devices.

Option 3: Full assessment according to IEC 61508

Option 3 is a full assessment by *exida.com* according to the relevant application standard(s) like IEC 61511 or EN 298 and the necessary functional safety standard(s) like DIN V VDE 0801, IEC 61508 or EN 954-1. The full assessment extends option 1 by an assessment of all fault avoidance and fault control measures during hardware and software development.

This option is most suitable for newly developed software based field devices and programmable controllers to demonstrate full compliance with IEC 61508 to the end-user.

This assessment shall be done according to option 1.

This document shall describe the results of the Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter. From these failure rates, the safe failure fraction (SFF) and example PFD_{AVG} values are calculated.

2 Project management

2.1 *exida.com*

exida.com is one of the world's leading knowledge companies specializing in automation system safety and availability with over 100 years of cumulative experience in functional safety. Founded by several of the world's top reliability and safety experts from assessment organizations like TUV and manufacturers, *exida.com* is a partnership with offices around the world. *exida.com* offers training, coaching, project oriented consulting services, internet based safety engineering tools, detail 3051S Pressure Transmitter assurance and certification analysis and a collection of on-line safety and reliability resources. *exida.com* maintains a comprehensive failure rate and failure mode database on process equipment.

2.2 Roles of the parties involved

Rosemount Inc. Manufacturer of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter
exida.com Project leader of the FMEDA

2.3 Standards / Literature used

The services delivered by *exida.com* were performed based on the following standards / literature.

[N1]	IEC 61508-2: 1999	Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems
[N2]	FMD-91 & FMD-97, RAC 1991, 1997	Failure Mode / Mechanism Distributions, Reliability Analysis Center. Statistical compilation of failure mode distributions for a wide range of components
[N3]	NPRD-95, RAC 1995	Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data, Reliability Analysis Center. Statistical compilation of failure rate data, incl. mechanical and electrical sensors
[N4]	SN 29500	Failure rates of components
[N5]	US MIL-STD-1629	Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA. MIL 1629.
[N6]	Telcordia (Bellcore) Failure rate database and models	Statistical compilation of failure rate data over a wide range of applications along with models for estimating failure rates as a function of the application.
[N7]	Safety Equipment Reliability Handbook, 2003	<i>exida.com</i> L.L.C, Safety Equipment Reliability Handbook, 2003, ISBN 0-9727234-0-4
[N8]	Goble, W.M. 1998	Control Systems Safety Evaluation and Reliability, ISA, ISBN #1-55617-636-8. Reference on FMEDA methods

2.4 Reference documents

2.4.1 Documentation provided by the Rosemount Inc.

D1	BOM 03151-1513-0001, November 28, 2001	Bill of Material, assembly item 03151-1513-0001, Cosmos Inline Electronics
D2	BOM 03151-1507-0001, November 28, 2001	Bill of Material, assembly item 03151-1507-0001, Cosmos DP "A"
D3	ASIC-3095-0106, rev. 0.4, October 08, 1996	Taconite 2 channel A/D application notes; document ASIC-3095-0106, revision 0.4
D4	ASIC 000, rev. 1.0, June 12, 1997	Marble ASIC product definition; document ASIC 000, revision 1.0.
D5	03151-1505, July 19, 2001	Schematic Cosmos Supermodel 3051C, 03151-1505, 4 pages
D6	03151-1511, July 20, 2001	Schematic Cosmos Supermodel 3051T, 03151-1511, 4 pages
D7	03151-4208, October 23, 2000	Schematic Terminal Block, Single Compartment – Transient, Cosmos Supermodel, 03151-4208, 1 page
D8	03151-4214, October 23, 2000	Schematic Cosmos Supermodel Transient Terminal Block Dual compartment, 03151-4214, 1 page
D9	03151-4700, September 11, 2001	Schematic Cosmos Interconnect and hardware adjust board, 03151-4700, 1 page
D10	03151-4600, November 16, 2001	Schematic drawing Cosmos LCD, 03151-4600, 4 pages

2.4.2 Documentation generated by *exida.com*

R1	FMEDA Rosemount 3051S_v110.xls, Final, December 4, 2001	System FMEDA, 3051S pressure transmitter, final version
R2	ROS 01-12-04 R210 V3 R2 FMEDA 3051S SW Rev 6 or below, August 27, 2007	FMEDA report, 3051S pressure transmitter, final version (based on R1)
R3	ROS 03/11/07 R001, V1 R1, January 16, 2004	Proven In Use Assessment, 3051S SuperModule Pressure Transmitter, V1 R1

3 3051S Pressure Transmitter Description

The 3051S Pressure Transmitter, Software Revision 6.0 and below, is a two-wire, 4 – 20 mA smart device used in many different industries for both control and safety applications. It contains self-diagnostics and is programmed to send it's output to a specified failure state, either high or low upon internal detection of a failure.

For safety instrumented systems usage it is assumed that the 4 – 20 mA output is used as the primary safety variable. All other possible output variants are not covered by this report. The different devices can be equipped with or without display. A graphical representation of the transmitter is shown in the following figure.




Figure 1 3051S Pressure Transmitter

The 3051S Pressure Transmitter, Software Revision 6.0 and below, is classified as a Type B² device according to IEC61508, having a hardware fault tolerance of 0.

The pressure transmitter can be connected to the process using an impulse line, depending on the application the clogging of the impulse line needs to be accounted for.

The FMEDA has been performed for the two versions of the 3051S transmitter, Coplanar and In-Line.

Type B component: "Complex" component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.3.1.3 of IEC 61508-2.

4 Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostics Analysis

The Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis was performed based on information obtained from done Rosemount Inc. and is documented in [R1] and [R2]. When the effect of a certain failure mode could not be analyzed theoretically, the failure modes were introduced on component level and the effects of these failure modes were examined on system level.

4.1 Description of the failure categories

In order to judge the failure behavior of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter, the following definitions for the failure of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter were considered.

Fail-Safe State	State where output exceeds the user defined threshold.
Fail Safe	Failure that causes the module / (sub)system to go to the defined fail-safe state without a demand from the process. Safe failures are divided into safe detected (SD) and safe undetected (SU) failures.
Fail Dangerous	Failure that deviates the measured input state or the actual output by more than 2% of span and that leaves the output within active scale (including frozen output).
Fail Dangerous Undetected	Failure that is dangerous and that is not being diagnosed by internal diagnostics.
Fail Dangerous Detected	Failure that is dangerous but is detected by internal diagnostics (These failures may be converted to the selected fail-safe state).
Fail High	Failure that causes the output signal to go to the maximum output current (> 21,5 mA, output saturate high)
Fail Low	Failure that causes the output signal to go to the minimum output current (< 3,6 mA, output saturate low)
Fail No Effect	Failure of a component that is part of the safety function but that has no effect on the safety function.
Annunciation Undetected	Failure that does not directly impact safety but does impact the ability to detect a future fault (such as a fault in a diagnostic circuit) and that is not detected by internal diagnostics.

The failure categories listed above expand on the categories listed in [N1] which are only safe and dangerous, both detected and undetected. The reason for this is that, depending on the application, a Fail High or a Fail Low can either be safe or dangerous and may be detected or undetected depending on the programming of the logic solver. Consequently, during a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) verification assessment the Fail High and Fail Low failure categories need to be classified as either safe or dangerous.

The Annunciation Undetected failures are provided for those who wish to do reliability modeling more detailed than required by IEC61508. In IEC 61508 [N1] the No Effect and Annunciation Undetected failures are defined as safe undetected failures even though they will not cause the safety function to go to a safe state. Therefore they need to be considered in the Safe Failure Fraction calculation.

4.2 Methodology – FMEDA, Failure rates

4.2.1 FMEDA

A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic way to identify and evaluate the effects of different component failure modes, to determine what could eliminate or reduce the chance of failure, and to document the system in consideration.

An FMEDA (Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic Analysis) is an FMEA extension. It combines standard FMEA techniques with extension to identify online diagnostics techniques and the failure modes relevant to safety instrumented system design. It is a technique recommended to generate failure rates for each important category (safe detected, safe undetected, dangerous detected, dangerous undetected, fail high, fail low) in the safety models. The format for the FMEDA is an extension of the standard FMEA format from MIL STD 1629A, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.

4.2.2 Failure rates

The failure rate data used by *exida.com* in this FMEDA is from a proprietary component failure rate database derived using the Telcordia (N6) failure rate database/models, the SN29500 (N4) failure rate database and other sources. The rates were chosen in a way that is appropriate for safety integrity level verification calculations. The rates were chosen to match operating stress conditions typical of an industrial field environment similar to IEC 645-1, Class C. It is expected that the actual number of field failures will be less than the number predicted by these failure rates.

The user of these numbers is responsible for determining their applicability to any particular environment. Accurate plant specific data may be used for this purpose. If a user has data collected from a good proof test reporting system that indicates higher failure rates, the higher numbers shall be used. Some industrial plant sites have high levels of stress. Under those conditions the failure rate data is adjusted to a higher value to account for the specific conditions of the plant.

4.3 Assumptions

The following assumptions have been made during the Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostic Analysis of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter.

- Only a single component failure will fail the entire 3051S Pressure Transmitter
- Failure rates are constant, wear out mechanisms are not included.
- Propagation of failures is not relevant.
- All components that are not part of the safety function and cannot influence the safety function (feedback immune) are excluded.
- The HART protocol is only used for setup, calibration, and diagnostics purposes, not for safety critical operation.
- The application program in the logic solver is constructed in such a way that Fail High and Fail Low failures are detected regardless of the effect, safe or dangerous, on the safety function.
- The 3051S is programmed to send it's output low upon detecting a failure; this is advised to avoid dangerous failures at low compliance voltages.

- The stress levels are average for an industrial environment and can be compared to the Ground Fixed classification of MIL-HNBK-217F. Alternatively, the assumed environment is similar to:
 - IEC 645-1, Class C (sheltered location) with temperature limits within the manufacturer's rating and an average temperature over a long period of time of 40°C. Humidity levels are assumed within manufacturer's rating.
- External power supply failure rates are not included.

4.4 Behavior of the safety logic solver

Depending on the application, the following scenarios are possible:

- Low Trip: the safety function will go to the predefined fail-safe state when the process value below a predefined low set value. A current < 3.6mA (Fail Low) is below the specified trip-point.
- High Trip: the safety function will go to the predefined fail-safe state when the process value exceeds a predefined high set value. A current > 21.5mA (Fail High) is above the specified trip-point.

The Fail Low and Fail High failures can either be detected or undetected by a connected logic solver. The PLC Detection Behavior in Table 3 represents the under-range and over-range detection capability of the connected logic solver.

Table 3 Application example

Application	PLC Detection Behavior	λ_{low}	λ_{high}
Low trip	< 4mA	= λ_{sd}	= λ_{du}
Low trip	> 20mA	= λ_{su}	= λ_{dd}
Low trip	< 4mA and > 20mA	= λ_{sd}	= λ_{dd}
Low trip	-	= λ_{su}	= λ_{du}
High trip	< 4mA	= λ_{dd}	= λ_{su}
High trip	> 20mA	= λ_{du}	= λ_{sd}
High trip	< 4mA and > 20mA	= λ_{dd}	= λ_{sd}
High trip	-	= λ_{du}	= λ_{su}

In this analysis it is assumed that the logic solver is able to detect under-range and over-range currents, therefore the yellow highlighted behavior is assumed.

4.5 Results

Using reliability data extracted from the exida.com component reliability database the following failure rates resulted from the Rosemount Inc. 3051S Pressure Transmitter FMEDA for both the Coplanar and the In-Line versions.

Table 4 Failure rates 3051S_C Coplanar Pressure Transmitter

Failure category		Failure rate (in FITs)
Fail High (detected by the logic solver)		59
Fail Low (detected by the logic solver)		283
Fail detected (int. diag.)	169	
Fail low (inherently)	114	
Fail Dangerous Undetected		63
No Effect		135
Annunciation Undetected		5

Table 5 Failure rates 3051S_T In-Line Pressure Transmitter

Failure category		Failure rate (in FITs)
Fail High (detected by the logic solver)		58
Fail Low (detected by the logic solver)		264
Fail detected (int. diag.)	157	
Fail low (inherently)	107	
Fail Dangerous Undetected		56
No Effect		113
Annunciation Undetected		7

It is assumed that upon the detection of a failure the output will be sent downscale, all detected failure categories are sub-categories of the fail low failure category.

According to IEC 61508 [N1], the Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter should be calculated. The SFF is the fraction of the overall failure rate of a device that results in either a safe fault or a diagnosed unsafe fault. As both the Fail High and Fail Low failure categories are assumed to be detected by the logic solver (regardless of the fact if their effect is safe or dangerous), the Safe Failure Fraction can be calculated independently of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter application.

This is reflected in the following formulas for SFF:

$$SFF = 1 - \lambda_{du} / \lambda_{total}$$

Note that according to IEC61508 definition the No Effect and Annunciation Undetected failures are classified as safe and therefore need to be considered in the Safe Failure Fraction calculation and are included in the total failure rate.

Table 6 Safe Failure Fraction of 3051S Pressure Transmitter

3051S Pressure Transmitter	SFF
3051S Coplanar	88.4%
3051S In-line	88.7%

The architectural constraint type for the 3051S Pressure Transmitter with Software Revision 6.0 and below is B. The SFF and required SIL determine the level of hardware fault tolerance that is required per requirements of IEC 61508 [N1] or IEC 61511. The SIS designer is responsible for meeting other requirements of applicable standards for any given SIL as well.

5 Using the FMEDA results

5.1 Impulse line clogging

The 3051S Pressure Transmitter failure rates that are displayed in section 4.5 are failure rates that reflect the situation where the transmitter is used in clean service. Clean service indicates that failure rates due to clogging of the impulse line are not counted. For applications other than clean service, the user must estimate the failure rate for the clogged impulse line and add this failure rate to the 3051S Pressure Transmitter failure rates.

5.2 Converting failure rates to IEC 61508 format

The failure rates that are derived from the FMEDA for the 3051S Pressure Transmitter, Software Revision 6.0 and below, are in a format different from the IEC 61508 format. This section will explain how the failure rates can be converted into the IEC 61508 format.

First of all, depending on the application, the high and low failure rates of the 3051S Pressure Transmitter must be classified as either safe or dangerous. Assume an application where a safety action needs to be performed if the pressure in a pipe drops below a certain level. The transmitter will therefore be configured with a low trip level. A low failure of the transmitter will cause the transmitter output to go through the low trip level. Consequently the transmitter will indicate that the safety action needs to be performed. Therefore a low failure can be classified as a safe failure for this application. A high failure on the other hand will cause the transmitter output to move away from the trip level and therefore not cause a trip. The failure will prevent the transmitter from indicating that the safety action needs to be performed and is therefore classified as a dangerous failure for this application.

Assuming that the logic solver can detect both over-range and under-range, a low failure can be classified as a safe detected failure and a high failure can be classified as a dangerous detected failure. For this application the failure rates for the 3051S_C Coplanar are:

$$\lambda^H = \lambda^{DD} = 59 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

$$\lambda^L = \lambda^{SD} = 283 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

$$\lambda^{DU} = 63 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

For the 3051S_T In-Line Pressure Transmitter the failure rates would be:

$$\lambda^H = \lambda^{DD} = 58 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

$$\lambda^L = \lambda^{SD} = 264 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

$$\lambda^{DU} = 56 * 10^{-9} \text{ failures per hour}$$

In a similar way the high and low failure rates can be classified as respectively safe detected and dangerous detected in case the application has a high trip level. The failure rates as displayed above are the same failure rates as stored in the exida.com equipment database that is part of the online SIL verification tool, SILver.

Furthermore the No Effect failures and Annunciation Undetected failure are classified as Safe Undetected failures according to IEC 61508. Note that these failures will not affect system reliability or safety, and should not be included in spurious trip calculations.

Note that the dangerous undetected failures will of course remain dangerous undetected.

5.3 PFD_{AVG} calculation 3051S Pressure Transmitter

An average Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD_{AVG}) calculation is performed for a single (1oo1) 3051S Pressure Transmitter with Software Revision 6.0 and below. The failure rate data used in this calculation is displayed in section 4.6.

The resulting PFD_{AVG} values for a variety of proof test intervals are displayed in Figure 2. As shown in the figure the PFD_{AVG} value for a single 3051S Coplanar Pressure Transmitter with a proof test interval of 1 year equals 2.76E-04.




Figure 2: PFD_{AVG}(t) 3051S_C Coplanar Pressure Transmitter

For SIL 1 applications, the PFD_{AVG} value needs to be $\geq 10^{-2}$ and $< 10^{-1}$. This means that for a SIL 1 application, the PFD_{AVG} for a 1-year Proof Test Interval of the 3051S_C Coplanar Pressure Transmitter is equal to 0.3% of the range. These results must be considered in combination with PFD_{AVG} values of other devices of a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) in order to determine suitability for a specific Safety Integrity Level (SIL).

The resulting PFD_{AVG} values for a variety of proof test intervals for a single 3051S_T In-Line Pressure Transmitter are displayed in Figure 3. As shown in the figure the PFD_{AVG} value for a single 3051S_T In-Line Pressure Transmitter with a proof test interval of 1 year equals 2.46E-04.




Figure 3 PFD_{AVG} values 3051S_T In-Line Pressure Transmitter

For SIL 1 applications, the PFD_{AVG} value needs to be $\geq 10^{-2}$ and $< 10^{-1}$. This means that for a SIL 1 application, the PFD_{AVG} for a 1-year Proof Test Interval of the 3051S_T In-Line Pressure Transmitter is equal to 0.25% of the range. These results must be considered in combination with PFD_{AVG} values of other devices of a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) in order to determine suitability for a specific Safety Integrity Level (SIL).

6 Terms and Definitions

FIT	Failure In Time (1×10^{-9} failures per hour)
FMEDA	Failure Mode Effect and Diagnostic Analysis
HART	Highway Addressable Remote Transducer
HFT	Hardware Fault Tolerance
Low demand mode	Mode, where the frequency of demands for operation made on a safety-related system is no greater than one per year and no greater than twice the proof test frequency.
PFD_{AVG}	Average Probability of Failure on Demand
SFF	Safe Failure Fraction summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failures which will be detected by diagnostic measures and lead to a defined safety action.
SIF	Safety Instrumented Function
SIL	Safety Integrity Level
SIS	Safety Instrumented System – Implementation of one or more Safety Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of sensor(s), logic solver(s), and final element(s).
Type A component	“Non-Complex” component (using discrete elements); for details see 7.4.3.1.3 of IEC 61508-2
Type B component	“Complex” component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); for details see 7.4.3.1.3 of IEC 61508-2

7 Status of the document

7.1 Liability

exida.com prepares FMEDA reports based on methods advocated in International standards. Failure rates are obtained from a collection of industrial databases. *exida.com* accepts no liability whatsoever for the use of these numbers or for the correctness of the standards on which the general calculation methods are based.

7.2 Releases

Version: V3
Revision: R2
Version History: V0, R0.1: Internal draft; December 17, 2001
V1, R1.0: Final; December 17, 2001
V2, R1.0: Updated report format, September 15, 2003
V3, R1.0: Updated failure data; appendices; May 27, 2005
V3, R2: Clarify product revision; August 27, 2007
Authors: William M. Goble – John C. Grebe – Iwan van Beurden
Review: V0, R0.1: William Goble
V1, R1.0: Iwan van Beurden
V2, R1.0 Rachel Amkreutz, September 15, 2003
Release status: released


7.3 Future Enhancements

At request of client.

7.4 Release Signatures



Ir. Iwan van Beurden, Senior Safety Engineer



John C. Grebe, Partner



Dr. William M. Goble, Principal Partner

Appendix A: Lifetime of critical components

Although a constant failure rate is assumed by the probabilistic estimation method (see section 4.3) this only applies provided that the useful lifetime of components is not exceeded. Beyond their useful lifetime the result of the probabilistic calculation method is therefore meaningless, as the probability of failure significantly increases with time. The useful lifetime is highly dependent on the component itself and its operating conditions – temperature in particular (for example, electrolyte capacitors can be very sensitive).

This assumption of a constant failure rate is based on the bathtub curve, which shows the typical behavior for electronic components.

Therefore it is obvious that the PFD_{AVG} calculation is only valid for components which have this constant domain and that the validity of the calculation is limited to the useful lifetime of each component.

Table 7 shows which electrolytic capacitors are contributing to the dangerous undetected failure rate and therefore to the PFD_{AVG} calculation and what their estimated useful lifetime is.

Table 7: Useful lifetime of electrolytic capacitors contributing to λ_{du}

Type	Useful life at 40°C
Capacitor (electrolytic) - Tantalum electrolytic, solid electrolyte	Appr. 500 000 hours

As there are no aluminum electrolytic capacitors used, the limiting factors with regard to the useful lifetime of the system are the Tantalum electrolytic capacitors. The Tantalum electrolytic capacitors have an estimated useful lifetime of about 50 years. According to section 7.4.7.4 of IEC 61508-2, a useful lifetime, based on experience, should be assumed. According to section 7.4.7.4 note 3 of IEC 61508 experiences have shown that the useful lifetime often lies within a range of 8 to 12 years for transmitters.

Appendix B: Proof tests to reveal dangerous undetected faults

According to section 7.4.3.2.2 f) of IEC 61508-2 proof tests shall be undertaken to reveal dangerous faults which are undetected by diagnostic tests. This means that it is necessary to specify how dangerous undetected faults which have been noted during the FMEDA can be detected during proof testing.

B.1 Proof test 1

Proof test 1 consists of the following steps, as described in Table 8.

Table 8 Steps for Proof Test 1

Step	Action
1	Bypass the safety PLC or take other appropriate action to avoid a false trip
2	Send a HART command to the transmitter to go to the high alarm current output and verify that the analog current reaches that value. This tests for compliance voltage problems such as a low loop power supply voltage or increased wiring resistance. This also tests for other possible failures.
3	Send a HART command to the transmitter to go to the low alarm current output and verify that the analog current reaches that value. This tests for possible quiescent current related failures
4	Restore the loop to full operation
5	Remove the bypass from the safety PLC or otherwise restore normal operation

This test will detect approximately 66% of possible DU failures in the transmitter.

B.1 Proof test 2

Proof test 1 consists of the following steps, as described in Table 9.

Table 9 Steps for Proof Test 2

Step	Action
1	Bypass the safety PLC or take other appropriate action to avoid a false trip
2	Perform Proof Test 1
3	Perform a two-point calibration of the transmitter
4	Restore the loop to full operation
5	Remove the bypass from the safety PLC or otherwise restore normal operation

This test will detect approximately 96% of possible DU failures in the transmitter.

Appendix C: Common Cause for redundant transmitter configurations

A method for estimating the beta factor is provided in IEC 61508, part 6. This portion of the standard is only informative and other techniques may be used to estimate the beta factor. Based on the approach presented in IEC 61508 a series of questions are answered. Based on the total points scored for these questions, the beta factor number is determined from IEC61508-6 Table D.4.

Example – 2oo3 Pressure Transmitters

A design is being evaluated where three Rosemount 3051S pressure transmitters are chosen. The transmitters are connected to a logic solver programmed to detect over-range and under-range currents as a diagnostic alarm. The process is not shutdown when an alarm occurs on one transmitter. The logic solver has a two out of three (2oo3) function block that votes to trip when two of the three transmitters indicate the need for a trip. Following the questions from the sensor portion of Table D.1 of IEC 61508, Part 6, the following results are obtained.

Table 10 Example version of Table D.1, Part 6 IEC 61508

Item	X _{SF}	Y _{SF}	Example	Score
Are all signal cables for the channels routed separately at all positions?	1.0	2.0	Not guaranteed	0.0
If the sensors/final elements have dedicated control electronics, is the electronics for each channel on separate printed-circuit boards?	2.5	1.5	Transmitters are separate	4.0
If the sensors/final elements have dedicated control electronics, is the electronics for each channel indoors and in separate cabinets?	2.5	0.5	Transmitters are in different housings	3.0
Do the devices employ different physical principles for the sensing elements for example, pressure and temperature, vane anemometer and Doppler transducer, etc.?	7.5		No – transmitters are identical	0.0
Do the devices employ different electrical principles/designs for example, digital and analogue, different manufacturer (not re-badged) or different technology?	5.5		No – transmitters are identical	0.0
Do the channels employ enhanced redundancy with MooN architecture, where N > M + 2?	2.0	0.5	No – 2oo3	0.0
Do the channels employ enhanced redundancy with MooN architecture, where N = M + 2?	1.0	0.5	No – 2oo3	0.0
Are separate test methods and people used for each channel during commissioning?	1.0	1.0	No - impractical	0.0
Is maintenance on each channel carried out by different people at different times?	2.5		No - impractical	0.0
Does cross-connection between channels preclude the exchange of any information other than that used for diagnostic testing or voting purposes?	0.5	0.5	No cross channel information between transmitters	1.0
Is the design based on techniques used in equipment that has been used successfully in the field for > 5 years?	1.0	1.0	3051S based on well proven design	2.0
Is there more than 5 years experience with the same hardware used in similar environments?	1.5	1.5	Extensive experience in process control	3.0
Are inputs and outputs protected from potential levels of over-voltage and over-current?	1.5	0.5	Transient voltage and current protection provided	2.0

Item	X _{SF}	Y _{SF}	Example	Score
Are all devices/components conservatively rated? (for example, by a factor of 2 or more)	2.0		Design has conservative rating factors proven by field reliability	2.0
Have the results of the failure modes and effects analysis or fault tree analysis been examined to establish sources of common cause failure and have predetermined sources of common cause failure been eliminated by design?		3.0	FMEDA done by third party – exida. No common cause issues	3.0
Were common cause failures considered in design reviews with the results fed back into the design? (Documentary evidence of the design review activity is required.)		3.0	Design review is part of the development process. Results are always fed back into the design	3.0
Are all field failures fully analyzed with feedback into the design? (Documentary evidence of the procedure is required.)	0.5	3.5	Field failure feedback procedure reviewed by third party – exida. Results are fed back into the design.	4.0
Is there a written system of work which will ensure that all component failures (or degradations) are detected, the root causes established and other similar items are inspected for similar potential causes of failure?	0.5	1.5	Proof test procedures are provided but they cannot insure root cause failure analysis.	0.0
Are procedures in place to ensure that: maintenance (including adjustment or calibration) of any part of the independent channels is staggered, and, in addition to the manual checks carried out following maintenance, the diagnostic tests are allowed to run satisfactorily between the completion of maintenance on one channel and the start of maintenance on another?	2.0	1.0	Procedures are not sufficient to ensure staggered maintenance.	0.0
Do the documented maintenance procedures specify that all parts of redundant systems (for example, cables, etc.), intended to be independent of each other, must not be relocated?	0.5	0.5	MOC procedures require review of proposed changes, but relocation may inadvertently be done.	0.0
Is all maintenance of printed-circuit boards, etc. carried out off-site at a qualified repair centre and have all the repaired items gone through a full pre-installation testing?	0.5	1.5	Repair is done by returning product to the factory, therefore this requirement is met.	2.0
Do the system diagnostic tests report failures to the level of a field-replaceable module?	1.0	1.0	Logic solver is programmed to detect current out of range and report the specific transmitter.	2.0
Have designers been trained (with training documentation) to understand the causes and consequences of common cause failures	2.0	3.0	Control system designers have not been trained.	0.0
Have maintainers been trained (with training documentation) to understand the causes and consequences of common cause failures	0.5	4.5	Maintenance personnel have not been trained.	0.0

Item	X _{SF}	Y _{SF}	Example	Score
Is personnel access limited (for example locked cabinets, inaccessible position)?	0.5	2.5	A tool is required to open the transmitter therefore this requirement is met.	3.0
Is the system likely to operate always within the range of temperature, humidity, corrosion, dust, vibration, etc., over which it has been tested, without the use of external environmental control?	3.0	1.0	Environmental conditions are checked at installation.	4.0
Are all signal and power cables separate at all positions?	2.0	1.0	No	0.0
Has a system been tested for immunity to all relevant environmental influences (for example EMC, temperature, vibration, shock, humidity) to an appropriate level as specified in recognized standards?	10.0	10.0	Rosemount has complete testing of all environmental stress variables and run-in during production testing.	20.0
Totals	23	37	S=X+Y	58

A score of 58 results in a beta factor of 5%. If the owner-operator of the plant would institute common cause training and more detailed maintenance procedures specifically oriented toward common cause defense, a score of greater than 70 could be obtained. Then the beta factor would be 2%.

Note that the diagnostic coverage for the transmitter is not being considered. Additional points can be obtained when diagnostics are taken into account. However this assumes that a shutdown occurs whenever any diagnostic alarm occurs. In the process industries this could even create dangerous conditions. Therefore the practice of automatic shutdown on a diagnostic fault is rarely implemented. IEC 61508, Part 6 has a specific note addressing this issue. The note states:

“NOTE 5 In the process industries, it is unlikely to be feasible to shut down the EUC when a fault is detected within the diagnostic test interval as described in table D.2. This methodology should not be interpreted as a requirement for process plants to be shut down when such faults are detected. However, if a shut down is not implemented, no reduction in the b-factor can be gained by the use of diagnostic tests for the programmable electronics. In some industries, a shut down may be feasible within the described time. In these cases, a non-zero value of Z may be used.”

In this example, automatic shutdown on diagnostic fault was not implemented so no credit for diagnostics was taken.

Appendix D: Review of operating experience

For the Rosemount 3051S pressure transmitter with hardware version Phase 1 and software version ROM 3, a review of proven-in-use documentation was performed. Design changes between hardware version Phase 1, software version ROM 3 and hardware version Phase 2, software version ROM 4 (current product) that were performed to the 3051S transmitter have been extensively documented.

The review focused on the volume of operating experience and number of returned units (see [R3])

Since the last major HW revision in 2002, the following operating experience exists:

3051S: over 80 million hours of operation in a wide range of applications

Failure rates, calculated on the basis of returns for Factory Analysis, show field failure rates that are below the failure rates predicted by the Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA). No systematic problems were identified based on the review of the return data.

Since 2002, there has been one major software revisions:

ROM 4 in 2003

This software revision did not modify the behavior of the transmitter in a significant way.

A separate assessment has been performed of the quality management, configuration management and modification systems within the Rosemount development department. All development and modification procedures have been independently certified and are compliant with IEC 61508 up to SIL 3. Units shipped back for Factory Analysis undergo a root cause analysis and results are documented and checked for systematic problems.